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 Chicago has been subject to much criticism over its aggressive 
vehicle impoundment program and excessive fines for traffic 
violations outlined in title 9 of its Municipal Code.1 Upon receiving 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Chicago–Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. My utmost gratitude to the Honorable Timothy A. Barnes, Professors 
Adrian Walters and Steven Harris, Lauren Hiller, and Nicholas Ballen for their 
considerable guidance and teaching me almost everything I know about bankruptcy, 
insolvency, and secured transactions. A special thanks as well to Ross Greenspan for 
our discussions. All errors are my own. 
 
1 Municipal Code of Chicago, tit. 9, ch. 4–124 (1990) (hereinafter “M.C.C.”) 
(available at: 
“http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/municipalcodeofchica
go?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il”). The stated purpose 
of Chicago’s traffic enforcement policy is to “provide for the administrative 
adjudication of violations of ordinances defining compliance, automated speed 
enforcement system, and automated traffic law enforcement system violations and 
regulating vehicular standing and parking within the city.” Id. at § 9-100-010. 
1
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notice of a traffic violation, an individual has seven days to either 
admit liability by paying the fine or request a hearing to contest the 
violation.2 The failure to respond results in the “entry of a 
determination of liability against such individual[,]” with such 
determination constituting “a debt due and owing the [C]ity.”3 If a 
vehicle owner has two or more determinations of liability, the City can 
impound his vehicle.4 Further, the City adds additional fines for each 
day the vehicle remains immobilized until the owner redeems by 
paying the traffic fine debt in full, in addition to the fees associated 
with towing and storage, and reimbursing the city for its efforts to 
collect on the outstanding debt.5 
 
In order to address this spiral of scofflaw debt, thousands of 
Chicagoans each year file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. These 
debtors do not necessarily seek to discharge this debt, but rather intend 
to file a plan to pay off their debts to all of their creditors over a period 
of time. In doing so, the City immediately becomes obliged to turn 
over their cars pursuant to Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corp.,6 where the Seventh Circuit held that the automatic stay 
protection in the Bankruptcy Code7 works to return seized property 
back to the debtor.8  
 
In recent years, more circuits have joined in the issue, each 
grappling with the language of section 362(a)(3), which prohibits “any 
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from 
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”9 Though 
                                                 
2
 Id. at § 9–100–050  
3
 Id.  
4
 Id. at §9–100–120.  
5
 Id. at § 9–92–080(a)-(b). 
6
 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009). 
7
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
8
 Thompson, 566 F.3d at 711. 
9
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
2
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the automatic stay is unquestionably broad,10 the circuits are split as to 
whether this provision also prohibits retaining possession of property 
seized by a creditor before the bankruptcy filing.11  
 
In 2016, Chicago tried to scheme around the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision when it codified an ordinance granting the city a possessory 
lien in every car impounds on account of outstanding traffic debt.12 
Now armed with the rights of a secured creditor,13 the City openly 
violated Thompson and began to refuse to turnover its immobilized 
vehicles upon bankruptcy filings. 
 
In 2019, In re Fulton14 afforded the Seventh Circuit the 
opportunity to review the automatic stay in light of a growing circuit 
split on the issue and a building tension in the bankruptcy courts 
between Chicago and its constituents.15 There, the court relied on 
precedent and the policy interests of the Bankruptcy Code to reiterate 
that section 362(a)(3) commands the City to return immobilized 
vehicles in its possession once their owners file for bankruptcy, even if 
the City claims a possessory lien on them.16 
 
This Note’s purpose is to analyze the automatic stay provision in 
bankruptcy, giving insight into its statutory framework, purpose, and 
effects, before ultimately concluding that the Seventh Circuit correctly 
                                                 
10
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(8).   
11
 Compare Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 81 (2d. Cir. 2013), 
Thompson, 566 F.3d at 711, Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dept. v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 
98 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996), Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 
889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989) with In re Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2019), In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2017) and United States v. 
Inslaw, 932 F.2d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
12
 M.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-92-080. 
13
 See infra notes 17–26 and the accompanying text therein.   
14
 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019).  
15
 See, e.g., In re Steenes, 918 F.3d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 2019) (the City accusing 
debtors of using bankruptcy as a sword to thwart traffic laws).  
16
 Fulton, 926 F.3d at 921–23. 
3
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decided Fulton. This Note will first give a brief introduction to 
bankruptcy law and security interests necessary to understand the 
issues presented by the automatic stay and chapter 13 bankruptcy 
relief. Second, this Note will address the automatic stay in detail 
before surveying the approaches taken in the developing split on the 
section 362(a)(3) issue. Third, this Note will discuss Fulton while 
emphasizing differences in the Seventh Circuit’s approach in light of 
recent decisions by other circuits. Last, in light of the Supreme Court 
granting certiorari,17 this Note will assert that the Seventh Circuit 




Bankruptcy is a system of federal law governed entirely under the 
Bankruptcy Code.18 Though not a requirement,19 an individual will 
commonly declare bankruptcy once he becomes insolvent, or when his 
debts exceed the sum of his assets.20 The process begins by the filing 
of a petition for relief, upon which the debtor provides notice to all 
creditors of the bankruptcy.21 Then, in order to be repaid, creditors of 
                                                 
17
 In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom., City of 
Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 680 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 19-357). 
18
 Article One of the United States Constitution empowers Congress “to 
establish . . . uniform [l]aws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4. The current bankruptcy laws are outlined in 
Title 11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012) (the “Bankruptcy 
Code” or the “Code”). All section numbers referenced in this Comment and 
accompanying notes herein refer to the Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise specified. 
19
 Insolvency is only a prerequisite for municipalities seeking to file for chapter 
9 relief. Individual debtors seeking to file for relief under chapters 7, 11, or 13 do not 
have to be insolvent at the time of filing. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (requires 
municipalities to be insolvent to be eligible for chapter 9 relief) with 11 U.S.C. § 
109(b) (prerequisites to file for chapter 7 relief); 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (prerequisites to 
file for chapter 11 relief); and 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (prerequisites to file for chapter 13 
relief). 
20
 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (defining insolvency). 
21
 11 § U.S.C. 109.  
4
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the debtor must appear and file a proofs of claim in the amount of the 
debt owed to them.22  
 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a claim represents a right to payment 
the creditor has against the debtor.23 An important distinction is 
whether the claim is secured or unsecured, which in turn relies on the 
remedies available to the creditor upon default.24 Unsecured claims are 
rights to payment against the debtor that are not secured by 
collateral.25 Conversely, secured creditors possess some sort of 
security in the debtor’s property that allows it a remedy to collect on 
the collateral.26 Secured claims arise from liens, which are defined 
under the Bankruptcy Code as a “charge against or interest in property 
to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.”27  
 
Further, a lien can be either consensual or nonconsensual, 
depending on if such lien arises upon consent of the debtor pursuant to 
a security agreement.28 Nonconsensual liens, like Chicago’s 
immobilization ordinance, are generally created two ways, either by 
statute, or by judgment. The former is considered a statutory lien, 
which is defined under the Bankruptcy Code as a “lien arising solely 
by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions . . .”29 
                                                 
22
 11 § U.S.C. 501(a).  
23
 11 § U.S.C. 101(5). A claim also includes the “right to an equitable remedy 
for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment . . . .” Id.  
24
 See generally BANKR. JUDGES DIV., ADMIN OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS, 21 at n.7 (Nov. 2011) (discussing secured claims 
and unsecured claims) (hereinafter “BANKRUPTCY BASICS”) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics–post10172005.pdf). Those 
possessing an unsecured claim are considered “unsecured creditors” while those 
possessing a secured claim are “secured creditors.” 
25
 See generally id.  
26
 See generally id. 
27
 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).  
28
 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (defining the term “security interest” to indicate “a lien 
created by agreement.”). 
29
 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).  
5
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The latter is a judicial lien, which is defined as a “lien obtained by 
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or 
proceeding.”30 
 
Once the claims are filed, the bankruptcy operates consistent with 
equitable principles in the furtherance of one goal—to round up the 
debtor’s assets and debts and distribute such assets in account of such 
debts in an orderly fashion.31 Within the Bankruptcy Code are three 
important concepts that act to further this goal––(1) the bankruptcy 
estate; (2) turnover; and (3) adequate protection. 
 
A. Property of the Estate: Section 541(a) 
 
Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, a bankruptcy estate32 is 
created under section 541(a).33 The estate is unquestionably broad in 
scope, as it consists of the “legal or equitable interests of the debtor.”34  
 
The importance of the bankruptcy estate is best understood by 
examining the differences amongst the available types of bankruptcy 
                                                 
30
 11 U.S.C. § 101(36).  
31
 See, e.g., In re Glenn, 542 B.R. 833, 841 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Above 
all, bankruptcy is a collective process, designed to gather together the assets and 
debts of the debtor and to effect an equitable distribution of those assets on account 
of the debts. The more participation there is; the better this process works.”) 
(referencing Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir. 
1989)).  
32
 The “estate” and “bankruptcy estate” are used interchangeably herein. 
33
 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).  
34
 Id.; see also Matter of Carousel Intern. Corp., 89 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“[E]very conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, 
contingent, speculative, and derivative, is within the reach of § 541.”). The 
Bankruptcy Code is the overriding authority to determine the extent of property of 
the estate. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 11 (1924); c.f. In re 
Barnes, 276 F.3d 927, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the debtor’s liquor license 
was property of the estate despite the license not being considered property under 
Indiana law, where the debtor filed for relief). Property rights, on the other hand, are 
determined by state law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
6
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relief. In chapter 7 cases, or “liquidation” proceedings, a bankruptcy 
trustee is appointed in order to liquidate non–exempt35 property of the 
estate.36 The proceeds of the liquidation are then distributed to the 
unsecured creditors.37 After the estate property has been liquidated, the 
bankruptcy case closes, and the debtor is granted a discharge of his 
outstanding debts.38 
 
Relief under Chapters 11 and 13, on the other hand, focus on 
reorganizing the debtor’s affairs to address his debts.39 Chapter 11 is 
commonly utilized by business entities, while Chapter 13 is commonly 
used by individual debtors.40 Notwithstanding the preceding, the 
premises of chapter 11 and chapter 13 are largely similar—the debtor 
formulates a plan to use discretionary post-petition income to repay 
creditors over a certain period time.41  
 
                                                 
35
 The Code authorizes individual debtors to claim exemptions on certain kinds 
of property in order to spare it from the liquidation process. See 11 U.S.C. § 522. 
Common examples include homestead exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), an 
exemption for household goods under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3), and an exemption for 
certain employment benefits under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10). 
36
 See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 15, at 7. 
37
 Id. (stating that chapter 13 “is designed for an individual debtor with a 
regular source of income . . . [while chapter 11] ordinarily is used by commercial 
enterprises that desire to continue operating a business and repay creditors 
concurrently through a court–approved plan of reorganization.”) 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id. at 7. Debtors under chapter 11 and chapter 13 retain their property and 
utilize income earned after the bankruptcy petition (“postpetition”) to pay their debts 
that accumulated before the bankruptcy filing (“prepetition”). Id. 
40
 Id. at 8. 
41
 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (chapter 13 debtors “must file a plan.”). The 
requisite length of the plan generally depends on the income of the debtor. If the 
debtor’s annual income is greater than the median income of the state in which he 
filed, the plan cannot exceed five years. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1). If the debtor’s 
income is greater than that state’s median income, the plan cannot exceed three years 
unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(2).  
7
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In furtherance of an individual reorganization, Chapter 13 permits 
debtors to retain possession of property of the estate.42 This applies to 
property of the estate encumbered by security interests, including 
mortgages and liens.43 However, in order for the plan to be approved 
by the court, the debtor must treat the secured claims in the plan by 
either (1) obtaining the secured creditors’ consent to the plan; (2) 
proposing to pay the full amount of the secured claim and provide, if 
applicable, “adequate protection” payments for the interests of the 
secured creditor (commonly referred as “cramdown”); or (3) 
surrendering the collateral to the secured creditor.44  
 
B. Turnover: Section 542(a) 
 
At the outset of the bankruptcy case, there are times where 
someone other than the debtor maybe be in possession of property of 
the estate. Further compounding this issue is when the repossessed 
asset would be of beneficial use to the bankruptcy estate. The 
Bankruptcy Code addresses these situations in section 542, which 
provides: 
 
[A]n entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or 
control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, 
sell, or lease . . . shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, 
                                                 
42
 See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (recognizing the same 
in chapter 11). 
43
 See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 15, at 22 (stating that “chapter 13 
allows individuals to reschedule secured debts . . . and extend them over the life of 
the chapter 13 plan.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (“By filing under this chapter, 
individuals can stop foreclosure proceedings and may cure delinquent mortgage 
payments over time.”). 
44
 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5). Section 1325 outlines the requirements for a court to 
confirm a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325. If a plan cannot be 
confirmed in a reasonable amount of time, a court may dismiss the bankruptcy case. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5).  
8
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such property or the value of such property, unless such 
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.45 
 
In essence, section 542 authorizes the “turnover” of estate 
property held by parties other than the debtor.46 If turnover is a 
contested matter, meaning there is a dispute over the legal or equitable 
interests of the property at issue, a turnover action must be brought 
under an adversary proceeding, which is a lawsuit separate from, but 
related to, the underlying bankruptcy case.47 Turnover can be 
incredibly important when the repossessed asset would be of 
beneficial use to the bankruptcy estate.  
 
C. Adequate Protection: Sections 363(e) and 361 
 
Though undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, the basic function of 
adequate protection is to protect the secured creditor’s interest in 
collateral during the pendency of the bankruptcy, especially upon the 
risk of its interest in collateral decreasing.48 A good example of this 
                                                 
45
 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (emphasis added).  
46
 See id. Section 542 may be referred herein as the “turnover provision.”  
47
 See generally BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 15, at 37. Adversary 
proceedings are governed under Rule 7001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. A turnover action is generally brought under an 
adversary proceeding because it is a “proceeding to recover money or property . . . .” 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(d); but see United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 
198, 211 (1983) (stating that a chapter 11 debtor does not need to commence a 
turnover action to recover property seized before the bankruptcy filing because such 
property is property of the estate, and section 542 is self–executing in this scenario), 
infra notes 62–87 and accompanying text. The commencement of an adversary 
proceeding to recover property may be referred herein as a “turnover action.” A 
chapter 13 debtor is allowed to commence a turnover action to recover property, but 
there is a current split as to whether such debtor may avail itself to automatic 
turnover of estate property (without commencing a turnover action) provided under 
Whiting Pools. See infra notes 62–87 and accompanying text. 
48
 See generally Sydney G. Platzer & Son K. Le, When is a Secured Creditor 
Entitled to Adequate Protection? An Emerging Trend, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, at 
50 (May 2005) (stating that “[t]he very heart of the concept of adequate protection is 
9
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can be seen with a mortgage, where the financer agrees to lend money 
for the debtor to purchase a home, and in return receives a security 
interest allowing it to take possession of and sell the property upon 
default. Should the debtor default on the mortgage and then 
subsequently file for bankruptcy, the automatic stay (as discussed 
later) would prevent the immediate sale of the property.49 If the 
bankruptcy filing occurred during a bearish real estate market, the 
value of the home (as collateral) decreases each day the foreclosure 
sale is stalled by the bankruptcy, thereby decreasing the amount of the 
secured claim to be paid over the course of a Chapter 13 plan.50   
 
In that scenario, the mortgagor would seek adequate protection of 
its interest under section 363(e), which provides: 
 
[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in 
property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or 
leased . . . the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit 
or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide 
adequate protection of such interest.51 
 
The words of the statute make clear that it is the creditor’s burden 
to request for adequate protection.52 If such request is made, the debtor 
must provide adequate protection of the concerned creditor’s interest 
in order to use the collateral at issue during the plan term.53 Section 
361 outlines the available methods to provide for adequate protection, 
                                                                                                                   
to assure the secured creditor that as the bankruptcy procedures unfold he will not be 
faced with a decrease in value of his collateral.”).  
49
 See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.  
50
 See supra notes 19–37 and accompanying text.  
51
 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).  
52
 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (stating that adequate protection is available at any 
time “on request of an entity that has an interest in property . . . “) (emphasis added). 
53
 In order to cramdown the plan over the objection of a secured creditor, the 
plan must provide for adequate protection of that creditor’s interest in the form of 
payments over the plan period. See 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(b)(iii)(II). 
10
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which include cash payments over the course of a plan or providing a 
replacement lien.54  
 
D. Whiting Pools – Putting them Together 
 
In United States v. Whiting Pools, the Supreme Court utilized the 
foregoing when it examined whether section 542 authorized the 
turnover of a Chapter 11 debtor’s property that was repossessed prior 
the bankruptcy filing.55 In Whiting Pools, the IRS seized certain 
equipment the debtor used in the course of its business, and in 
response, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief.56 Seeking 
to use the seized equipment in the reorganization of its business, the 
debtor then brought a turnover action to have the IRS return the 
property.57  
 
The Court held that the repossessed property constituted property 
of the estate and was subject to turnover on a self–executing basis 
under section 542(a).58 Though the debtor did not have a possessory 
interest in the property at the time of filing, the Court noted that the 
debtor had an equitable interest in the property, and such interest was 
unquestionably property of the estate.59 In order to promote the 
furtherance of the debtor’s reorganization efforts,60 the Court reasoned 
that section 542(a) effectively works to return the lost possessory 
interest in the property to the debtor in order to use the property for the 
                                                 
54
 11 U.S.C. § 361.  
55
 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 200–01 (1983).   
56
 Id. at 199 – 200. The IRS levied on the property pursuant to a federal tax 
lien. 
57
 Id.  
58
  Id. at 204. 
59
 Id. at 203 (citing 11 U.S.C. 541(a)).  
60
 See id. at 200 (noting that the “going–concern’ value [the value of the 
property in the use of the debtor’s business] of the seized property was over four 
times the amount of the liqudation value). 
11
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benefit of the estate.61 Though the IRS was effectively forced to give 
up possession in compliance with the turnover provision, the Court 
went on to note that it may seek adequate protection of its interest 
once the estate retained the seized property.62 
 
THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
 
The automatic stay is perhaps the most important consequence of 
filing for bankruptcy. Immediately upon the commencement of a 
bankruptcy case, section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code enjoins creditors 
from taking a variety of informal and formal actions by creditors to 
collect on their debts against the debtor.63 
 
The stay serves two essential purposes. First, it gives the debtor a 
“breathing spell” against harassment from creditors seeking to collect 
on their debts.64 Second, it bars the inevitable “race to the debtor’s 
assets”—where the creditors flock to the courts to obtain judgment 
liens—in order to place all creditors on a level playing field.65 Because 
these purposes are unquestionably important to the collective nature of 
                                                 
61
 Id. at 203–205. The Court utilized Congressional reports to note the broad 
scope of the bankruptcy estate under 541(a)(1). 
62
 Id. at 203–204 (noting that Congress chose to include secured property in the 
estate and to provide adequate protection to those who seek it); see also id. at 204 
(stating that secured creditors must utilize adequate protection, “rather than the 
nonbankruptcy remedy of possession.”). 
63
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  
64
 H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 340 (1977) (“It gives the debtor a breathing spell 
from its creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure 
actions. It permits the debtor to . . . be relieved of financial pressures that drove him 
into bankruptcy.”); see also Dean v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755 
(9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing same). 
65
 See, e.g., In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that the 
automatic stay protects “what remains of the debtor’s insolvent estate and provides a 
systematic equitable liquidation procedure for all creditors . . . thereby preventing a 
chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor’s assets”) 
12
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bankruptcy, creditors who violate the automatic stay may be punished 
with contempt sanctions.66  
 
The stay under section 362(a) lists eight types of prohibited 
creditor conduct.67 Part A of this section takes a close look at section 
362(a), emphasizing section 362(a)(3), which prohibits “any act to 
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the 
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate” by a creditor.68 
Part B then discusses 362(b), which outlines the exceptions to the stay, 
emphasizing section 362(b)(3). 
 
A. Section 362(a)(3) 
 
Section 362(a)(3) prohibits “any act to obtain possession of 
property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise 
                                                 
66
 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).  
67
 The stay prohibits: (1) “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, 
administrative, or other action against the debtor that was or could have been 
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this 
title”; (2) “the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a 
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title”; (3) “any 
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to 
exercise control over property of the estate”; (4) “any act to create, perfect, or 
enforce any lien against property of the estate”; (5) “any act to create, perfect, or 
enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a 
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title”; (6) “any act 
to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title”; (7) “the setoff of any debt owing to the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any 
claim against the debtor”; and (8) “the commencement or continuation of a 
proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning a tax liability of a debtor 
that is a corporation for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or 
concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period 
ending before the date of the order for relief under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1-
8). 
68
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
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control over property of the estate.”69 Prior to 1984, section 362(a)(3) 
applied to stay “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate 
or of property of the estate,”70 and so only prohibited seizing the 
debtor’s property after the bankruptcy case commenced. The 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 amended 
the provision to apply to any act to “exercise control over property of 
the estate.”71 
 
In light of Whiting Pools, courts have pondered whether the 1984 
amendment represented Congress’s tacit approval of the decision, 
which has since lead to the position that sections 362(a)(3) and 542(a) 
collectively place an affirmative obligation on creditor to turn over 
seized estate property upon the filing of a petition.72 Courts are 
currently split as to whether this “passive retention” is an act to 
exercise control over such property, thus constituting a violation of the 
automatic stay, with a slight majority finding in the affirmative.73 
 
1. The Majority View 
 
The Second,74 Seventh,75 Eighth,76 and Ninth Circuits77 compose 
the majority interpretation that section 362(a)(3) works collectively 




 See Eugene R. Wedoff, The Automatic Stay Under § 362(a)(3)—One More 
Time, 38 NO. 7 BANKR. L. LETTER NL 1 (2018) (hereinafter “Wedoff”) (discussing 
the history of section 362(a)(3)). 
71
 Id. (citing Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984)). 
72
 See Wedoff, supra note 64; see also In re Javens, 107 F.3d 359, 368 (6th Cir. 
1997) (surveying courts). 
73
 Compare Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2013), 
Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2009), 
Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dept. v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th 
Cir. 1996), and Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 
(8th Cir. 1989) with In re Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2019), In re 
Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Inslaw, 932 F.2d 
1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
74
 Weber, 719 F.3d at 81. 
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with section 542(a) to require the turnover of repossessed collateral 
upon the bankruptcy filing. These circuits prioritize reading section 
362(a) in accordance with two important policy goals of the 
Bankruptcy Code—to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for 
the benefit of all creditors and minimize the costs of the estate.78  
 
The Seventh Circuit decided this question as a matter of first 
impression in Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.79 In 
Thompson, the debtor purchased a vehicle under an installment 
contract that granted a purchase money security interest (a “PMSI”)80 
in the car to a car dealership.81 The dealership repossessed the car after 
the debtor defaulted on his payments and, in response, the debtor filed 
for chapter 13 relief.82 Now in bankruptcy, the debtor requested that 
the creditor return the vehicle to him.83 After the dealership refused to 
                                                                                                                   
75
 Thompson, 566 F.3d at 703; see also In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 920 (7th 
Cir. 2019) (declining to overrule Thompson). 
76
 Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775. 
77
 Taxel, 98 F.3d at 1151.  
78
 See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (stating that an “asset actively used by a 
debtor serves a greater purpose to both the debtor and his creditors than sitting idle 
on a creditor’s lot.”); see also Weber, 719 F.3d at 81 (citing Thompson), Taxel, 98 
F.3d at 1151–52 (noting that to hold otherwise and require a debtor to commence a 
turnover action to recover property “rightfully due to a bankruptcy estate is a very 
real concern.”), Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775 (stating that the other creditors in the 
bankruptcy should not have the financial burden associated with a turnover action of 
property that rightfully belongs to the estate). 
79
 566 F.3d 699.  
80
 A purchase money security interest is a security interest where the purchased 
goods serve as collateral that secures for the purchaser’s (or the debtor’s) obligation 
to pay for such goods. U.C.C. § 9–103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 
2000). An installment contract is a common example. The dealership sells the car on 
credit to the purchaser, and in consideration, the dealership is granted a security 
interest in the car to secure the purchaser’s obligation to make payments on the 
vehicle. For a general background on consensual security interests, see generally 
supra notes 10–23 and accompanying text.  
81
 Thompson, 566 F.3d at 700–01.  
82
 Id. at 701.  
83
 Id.  
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turn over the car back to the debtor, the debtor moved for sanctions.84 
The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the debtor directly 
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.85 
 
The court began its analysis by noting the similarity of issues 
presented in Whiting Pools. Though Whiting Pools solely focused on 
Chapter 11 cases,86 the Seventh Circuit recognized that the purposes of 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy are roughly the same—to allow 
the debtor to reorganize his affairs while simultaneously addressing his 
debts.87 Because Whiting Pools held that section 542(a) effectively 
grants the estate a possessory interest in seized property, the court 
found that the same rationale should apply to chapter 13 cases, and 
thus held that the turnover provision compelled the dealership to return 
the car to the estate.88  
 
With the turnover issue settled, the court then pondered whether 
knowingly retaining assets subject to the turnover provision could 
                                                 
84
 Id.  
85
 Id. Appeals from the bankruptcy courts are normally heard by the district 
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2010). However, if the appeal is a question of law for 
which there is no controlling precedent, either the bankruptcy court or a party at 
interest may request that the appeal be heard directly by the circuit court of appeals. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B)(i) (the bankruptcy court may ask for a direct appeal 
under certain circumstances found under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i), one of which 
being that “the judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law as to which 
there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals . . . .”). 
86
 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211 (1983) (the 
Supreme Court solely discussed the purpose of chapter 11 bankruptcy); see also 
supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.  
87
 See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (“The primary goal of reorganization 
bankruptcy is to group all of the debtor’s  property together in his estate such that he 
may rehabilitate his credit and pay off his debts; this necessarily extends to all 
property, even property seized pre-petition.”) (referencing United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–204 (1983)); see also id. at 705 (“The principle 
behind Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 is the same – allow the debtor to reorganize and 
repay the majority of his debts without having to liquidate his assets.”). 
88
 Id. at 703–704. 
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violate the automatic stay.89 The court looked at the plain language of 
section 362(a), specifically at what it means to “exercise control” over 
an asset.90 The court consulted the dictionary definition of control: “to 
exercise restraining or directing influence over” or “to have power 
over.”91 Noting that “[h]olding on to a debtor’s asset, refusing to return 
it, and otherwise prohibiting a debtor’s beneficial use of an asset all fit 
within this definition,” the court reasoned that the passive retention of 
a seized asset is an act to exercise control over property of the estate 
under section 362(a)(3).92 
 
2. The Minority View 
 
On the other hand, the Third, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits all 
compose the minority view that section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit 
passively retaining an asset belonging to the estate.93 The minority 
position places emphasis on the literal interpretation of the word “act” 
as it appears in the statute to hold that the automatic stay only 
prohibits affirmative acts to exercise control over estate property.94 
That rationale also leads these courts to determine that a creditor is not 
affirmatively obligated to turn over such property.95 
 
Shortly after Fulton was decided, the Third Circuit joined the 
minority approach in In re Denby-Peterson, a case with almost 
                                                 
89
 Thompson, 566 F.3d at 704.  
90
 Id. at 702. 
91
 Id. (quoting Control, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th 




 In re Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2019), In re Cowen, 849 
F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2017) 
94
 See Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d at 124–125 (consulting the dictionary to 
define an “act” as, generally “something done”) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted); see also Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949 (using the dictionary to reason that 
section 362(a)(3) “stays entities from doing something to obtain possession of or 
control over the estate’s property.”) (emphasis in original). 
95
 See, e.g., Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949 (“Stay means stay, not go.”).  
17
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identical facts to those in Thompson.96 The Third Circuit first 
examined, as did the Tenth Circuit, whether passively retaining an 
asset constitutes an “act” under section 362(a)(3).97 After consulting 
the dictionary, the court concluded that in order for there to be an 
“act[,]” in violation of the stay, such act must be an “affirmative act to 
exercise control over property of the estate.”98 In so doing, the court 
rejected the legislative history arguments presented in Fulton, noting 
that Congress did not express any intent to include passive acts within 
the automatic stay’s scope.99 
 
Finally, the Third Circuit then declined to read section 362(a)(3) 
in conjunction with section 542(a), instead outlining a three-step 
method for a debtor to seek turnover of seized property.100 The court 
stated that all actions to recover property must be brought under an 
adversary proceeding in accordance with the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, and that turnover actions are not exempt from 
this requirement.101 The court then noted that if a debtor could force 
                                                 
96
 Compare Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 119–20 with Thompson v. Gen. 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2009). 
97
 Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 125; see also Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949. 
98
 Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 125–26 (citing Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949, United 
States v. Inslaw, 932 F.2d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
99
 Id. at 127 (stating that the “legislative history fails to shed light on 
Congress’s intent behind the 1984 edition of the ‘exercise control over property of 
the estate’ clause.”); but see In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(declining to overrule Thompson and reiterating that the 1984 amendment 
“suggested congressional intent to make the stay more inclusive by including 
conduct of ‘creditors who seized an asset prepetition.’”) (quoting Thompson, 566 
F.3d at 702 (citation omitted)). 
100
 See id. at 131 (outlining a framework for recovering seized property as: “(1) 
the Chapter 13 debtor must seek court relief, such as by initiating an adversary 
proceeding requesting turnover; (2) the Bankruptcy Court then determines whether 
property is subject to turnover; and (3) if it is, in accordance with that determination, 
the Bankruptcy Court issues a court order compelling a creditor to turn over property 
to the debtor.”). 
101
  Id. at 129 (stating that all turnover under 542(a) is an action to recover 
property under the Bankruptcy Rules) (referencing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1)); see 
also In re Cowen, 849 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is still no link 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
 
the immediate turnover of seized property, it would temporarily 
suspend any applicable affirmative defense to the turnover proceeding, 
such as claiming that the seized property was not property of the 
estate.102 Further, the court examined the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf,103 which held that a bank-
creditor’s failure to turnover a debt owed to the debtor upon demand 
under section 542(b) was not a violation of the stay.104 Leaning on 
Strumpf, the Tenth Circuit became unconvinced that section 542(a)’s 
text necessarily demanded the return of property seized prepetition.105 
 
B. Section 362(b)(3) 
 
Section 362(b) outlines several enumerated exceptions to the 
automatic stay.106 Pertinent here is section 362(b)(3), which excludes 
                                                                                                                   
between [section] 542 and [section] 362.”); but see Thompson, 566 F.3d at 711 
(using section 362(a)(3) in conjunction with section 542(a) to find that turnover of 
estate property is self-executing), Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dept. v. Taxel (In re Del Mission 
Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring debtors to prosecute a 
turnover action in order to recover property “rightfully due to a bankruptcy estate is 
a very real concern.”), Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 
775 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that other creditors in the bankruptcy should not have the 
financial burden associated with a turnover action of property that rightfully belongs 
to the estate). 
102
 Id. at 129–30.  
103
 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995).  
104
 See Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 131 (discussing Strumpf). Section 542(b) 
provides that “an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate . . . shall pay 
such debt to, or on the order of, the trustee . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 542(b). Strumpf held 
that section 542(b) did not command a bank-creditor to turn over a debt it owed to 
the debtor so as to preserve the bank’s right to setoff under section 553. 516 U.S. at 
21.  
105
 Id. (using Strumpf’s holding that section 542(b) did not mandate a for the 
proposition that “shall deliver” in section 542(a) does not command a creditor to 
deliver seized property) 
106
 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(8). Other exceptions to the stay worth 
mentioning include: criminal actions against the debtor; certain actions to determine 
domestic support liability; government acts to enforce a judgment, other than a 
19
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from the stay certain post-petition actions to perfect or to maintain or 
continue the perfection of a prepetition interest in property.107 The 
exception applies to the holders of unperfected security interests where 
applicable state law allows such interest holders to perfect their liens 
or interests as of an effective date that is earlier than the date of 
perfection, or “retroactive perfection.”108  
 
The purpose and significance of the exception is best understood 
by addressing its scope. The exception is limited by its companioning 
provision, section 546(b), to apply only where the trustee would be 
able to eradicate or “avoid” an unperfected security interest under its 
“strong arm” powers under section 544(a).109 For example, suppose a 
creditor enters into a security agreement with a debtor, pursuant to the 
laws of a state adopting UCC Article 9, granting the creditor a lien on 
some of the debtor’s property.110 Shortly thereafter, the debtor then 
files for bankruptcy before the creditor is able to file the necessary 
financing statement to perfect its lien. The trustee would be able to 
eliminate or “avoid” this lien pursuant to section 544, which grants it 
the power to avoid unperfected security interests.111 Section 362(b)(3), 
                                                                                                                   
money judgment, pursuant to a relevant police power; and certain actions to offset a 
debts between a creditor and a debtor. 
107
 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3).  
108
 S. REP. NO. 95–989, at 86–87 (1978). For more background on perfection, 
see generally Irve J. Goldman, The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Prejudgment 
Attachment Lien, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2014). A lien represents right 
against property, and property rights are determined by state law. Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
109
 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (stating the exception applies to maintain 
perfection “to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such 
perfection under section 546(b) . . . .”) (emphasis added). Section 546(b) provides 
that the trustee’s avoidance power under section 544 is subject to applicable law that 
permits retroactive perfection or retroactive maintenance of perfection. 11 U.S.C. § 
546(b). 
110
 For background, see generally supra notes 10–23 and accompanying text. 
111
 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a). Upon the bankruptcy filing, the trustee is 
empowered with the rights of a judicial lien creditor against all estate property. Id. 
Under U.C.C. Article 9, an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the interest 
20
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therefore, allows for the creditor to file a financing statement (or other 
method to perfect) its interest notwithstanding the bankruptcy, so as to 
protect its interest against the trustee’s avoidance power.112 
 
C. In re Fulton 
 
In 2017, Chicago–native Robbin Fulton purchased a new car in 
order to transport her young child and care for her parents on 
weekends.113 Three weeks later, the City impounded the car for an 
outstanding citation of driving on a suspended license.114 Fulton then 
filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in the Northern District of 
Illinois one month later.115 
 
Shortly after the bankruptcy court approved her Chapter 13 plan, 
Fulton requested that the City return her vehicle.116 The City refused to 
comply with the request and instead responded by amending its proof 
of claim to include impound fees and assert a security interest in the 
                                                                                                                   
of a competing judicial lien creditor with respect to collateral. U.C.C. § 9–103 (AM. 
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000). Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code grants the 
avoidance power, while the U.C.C., a state law, determines the priority. For a greater 
background on avoidance powers, see generally Richard J. Mason, Patricia K. 
Smoots, When Do the Creditors’ Shoes Fit?: A Bankruptcy Estate’s Power to Assert 
the Rights of a Hypothetical Judgment Creditor, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435 (2017). 
112
 See generally id. Without section 362(b)(3), perfecting an interest on estate 
property during the bankruptcy would be a violation of the automatic stay. See 11 
U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (the automatic stay prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or 
enforce any lien against property of the estate”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (also 
prohibiting “any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any 
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement 
of [the bankruptcy case].”). 
113
 In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2019). 
114
 Id. at 921.  
115
 In re Fulton, No. 18 BK 02860, 2018 WL 2570109, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
May 31, 2018), aff’d, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019). 
116
 Id. at *2.  
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car.117 Fulton then moved for sanctions against the City for violating 
the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) on the grounds that 
Thompson required the City to turn the vehicle over to her.118  
 
The bankruptcy court granted Fulton’s motion and required the 
City to turn over Fulton’s car within one day.119 One week later, the 
court denied the City’s motion for a stay pending appeal.120 The City 
then appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which consolidated its appeal 
with three other appeals from cases with similar facts.121 
 
In Fulton, the City presented three grounds for appeal. First, the 
City argued that Thompson was wrongly decided and should be 
overruled for two reasons—passively retaining the seized cars was not 
an “act” to exercise control over estate property under section 
362(a)(3), and even if it were, the City contended that it was not 
obliged to turn the vehicles over until their owners filed adversary 
proceedings and provided adequate protection for the City’s interest.122 
Second, the City argued that even if Thompson controlled, retention of 
the vehicles was necessary to maintain perfection of its security 
interests and is so exempted from the stay under section 362(b)(3).123 
Last, the City alternatively asserted that it was exempted under section 
                                                 
117
 Id. The City asserted a possessory lien with respect to Fulton’s car pursuant 
to the Chicago Municipal Code. See generally notes 1–8 and accompanying text.  
118
 Id.  
119
 Id. at *8. Judge Schmetterer actually found that Municipal Code § 9–92–
080 did not grant the City a valid possessory interest over Fulton’s car because the 
ordinance exceeds Chicago’s authority as a home-rule body. See id. at 5–6 
(referencing In re Howard, 584 B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)). This matter is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
120
 In re Fulton, 588 B.R. 834, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018). 
121
 In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 2019); see also In re Howard, 584 
B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018); In re Peake, 588 B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018); 
In re Shannon, 590 B.R. 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018). 
122
 Fulton, 926 F.3d at 922. 
123
 Id. at 927. 
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362(b)(4), because it retained the vehicles in an effort to enforce its 
police power.124 
 
Turning to the City’s first argument, the court quickly declined to 
overrule Thompson, citing that the City gave no argument that was not 
considered and subsequently rejected by the Thompson court.125 The 
court similarly restated the policy interests served by the Bankruptcy 
Code, noting that “the breathing room given to a debtor that attempts 
to make a fresh start, and the equality of distribution of assets among 
similarly situated creditors according to the priorities set forth within 
the Code.”126 Notably, the court reaffirmed that its interpretation of 
section 362(a)(3) was aligned with the majority view.127 
 
On the City’s second argument, the Seventh Circuit agreed with 
the lower courts in finding that the City’s passive retention practice 
was not excepted under section 362(b)(3).128 In so doing, the court 
looked closely at the interplay of section 362(b)(3) and section 546(b), 
explaining that “the purpose of these sections is to prevent creditors 
from losing their lien rights because of the bankruptcy; they do not 
permit creditors to retain possession of debtors’ property.”129 The court 
then rejected the City’s argument that it must retain possession of the 
vehicles to maintain perfection of its purported liens.130 The court 
reasoned that it was not necessary for the City to maintain possession 
of the vehicles to remain a secured creditor because it could have 
otherwise filed a financing statement with the Illinois Secretary of 
State, thereby giving constructive notice of its “possessory lien” or 
                                                 
124
 Id.  
125
 Id. at 924–925.  
126
 Id. at 925 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2019)).  
127
 Fulton was decided less than two years following the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in In re Cowen.   
128
 Fulton, 926 F.3d at 929. 
129
 Id. at 928.  
130
 Id.  
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security interest in the debtor’s property.131 Additionally, the court 
rejected the argument that the City’s forced compliance with the 
automatic stay would terminate its claimed interest.132 In so doing, the 
court utilized Illinois common law to determine that involuntary loss 
of possession does not extinguish a possessory lien.133  
 
Last, the court found that the City was not exempt under section 
362(b)(4).134 The court first examined the City’s retention practice 
under the pecuniary purpose test, asking whether the City’s impound 
laws were “designed to further the safety and welfare of Chicago 
residents” and that the City only receives an “ancillary pecuniary 
benefit” in the process.135 The court answered in the negative, 
reasoning that by retaining the vehicles until the traffic debt was paid 
in full, the City was attempting to position itself ahead of other 
creditors and subvert the bankruptcy process.136 The court then found 
that the impound laws also violate the public policy test.137 The court 
stated that parking tickets and minor moving violations do not 
implicate traditional police power regulations, which typically 
implicate public health and environmental concerns.138 Rather, the 
court importantly pointed out the City’s heavy reliance on collecting 
parking and traffic tickets as a revenue gaining measure.139 
                                                 
131
 Id.  
132
 Id. at 928–29.  
133
 Id. (referencing In re Estate of Miller, 197 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (1990) (“The 
law respecting common law retaining liens is that the involuntary relinquishment of 
retained property pursuant to a court order does not result in the loss of the lien.”)). 
134
 Id. at 931.  
135
 Id. at 929–30 (quotations in original). 
136
 Id.  
137
 Id. at 931.  
138
 Id.  
139
 Id.  
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Overall, the Seventh Circuit decided Fulton correctly, given the 
precedent set forth in Thompson and understanding the purpose and 
policy goals of chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
 
First, Fulton reaffirms the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of the 
purpose of Chapter 13 bankruptcy—it operates for the benefit of all by 
allowing for the debtor to reorganize his affairs and utilize post-
petition income to pay his preexisting debts.140 A Chapter 13 debtor is 
a fiduciary to the creditors of the bankruptcy estate, and he must be 
able to utilize his estate property, including his car, for the benefit of 
all. He cannot do so if the City is allowed to prefer itself by 
demanding payment ahead of everyone else.141 
 
Further illustrative here is that the Seventh Circuit, along with the 
rest of the majority, understood the importance of both maximizing the 
estate and minimizing its expenses. Looking at the former, a car is an 
unquestionably important means of transportation for Chicagoans who 
may commute to and from work. If the City were allowed to retain the 
vehicles during the early stages of the bankruptcy process, these 
debtors would have interim difficulties getting to work and earning 
income used to pay off their debt in a payment plan. Without reliable 
post-petition income, any hope of reorganization is lost, as the 
bankruptcy would ultimately be dismissed.142 Therefore, the debtors 
are not the only party in reliance their own income—the other 
creditors are as well. 
 
                                                 
140
 See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.  
141
 See In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 931 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he City needs to 
satisfy the debts owed to it through the bankruptcy process, as do all other 
creditors.”).  
142
 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6) (providing that cases can be dismissed for 
material default). 
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Second, should the debtor be forced to commence an adversary 
proceeding to recover his car, it would either severely delay the return 
of property rightfully belonging to the estate, or even worse, place 
pressure on the debtor to pay the City immediately—a result abhorrent 
to the purpose of the automatic stay.143 To hold otherwise would be 
condoning the City’s practice of preferring itself to all other creditors 
to the bankruptcy estate.  
 
Despite the minority view’s criticism,144 Fulton’s interpretation of 
section 362(a)(3) also preserves the text of its companion provisions—
section 542(a) and section 363(e). If a creditor could lawfully retain 
possession of estate property in spite of the automatic stay, such 
creditor’s burden to seek adequate protection, as imposed under 
363(e), becomes rather meaningless.145 Conversely, by requiring a 
creditor to return seized property upon the bankruptcy filing, the 
burden to seek adequate protection remains with the creditor, just as 
Whiting Pools stated.146  
 
Though not quite as pressing as the section 362(a)(3) issue, it is 
also worth noting that the Seventh Circuit correctly examined the 
nature of the exception under section 362(b)(3). The City does not 
need to retain possession to maintain a security interest in the 
immobilized vehicles, because the trustee cannot avoid the interest 
                                                 
143
 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
144
 See, e.g., In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 949 (criticizing the majority view’s 
use of policy arguments and legislative history while simultaneously abstaining from 
“faithful adherence to the text.”). 
145
 Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 
2009) 
146
 See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text. 
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under Illinois law.147 The City instead could also can seek a 




 Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief relies heavily on equitable 
principles in order to promote a fair and efficient reorganization of a 
debtor’s affairs. Section 362(a)(3) works in furtherance of this goal by 
maximizing the bankruptcy estate’s value and minimizing its burdens. 
The Seventh Circuit correctly identified the foregoing in Fulton, and 
the Supreme Court should follow suit. 
 
                                                 
147
 See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text. See also In re Estate of 
Miller, 197 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (1990) (“The law respecting common law retaining 
liens is that the involuntary relinquishment of retained property pursuant to a court 
order does not result in the loss of the lien.”) 
148
 11 U.S.C. § 361; see also In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 929 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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